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Abstract
This study explores the evolution of income inequality in an economy featuring an
endogenous transition from stagnation to growth. We incorporate heterogenous house-
holds into a Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeo¤. In the pre-industrial era, the
economy is in stagnation, and income inequality is determined by an unequal distri-
bution of land ownership and remains stationary. When takeo¤ occurs, the economy
experiences innovation and economic growth. In this industrial era, income inequal-
ity gradually rises until the economy reaches the balanced growth path. Finally, we
calibrate the model for a quantitative analysis and compare the simulation results to
historical data in the UK.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal work, Kuznets (1955) hypothesizes that industrialization increases income
inequality. Analyzing historical data in Britain, Williamson (1980, 1985) provides evidence
for this hypothesis that income inequality increases after the Industrial Revolution and keeps
rising until the mid-19th century.1 To explore this issue, we incorporate heterogenous house-
holds into the Schumpeterian model with endogenous takeo¤ in Peretto (2015). Then, we
derive the evolution of income inequality when the economy experiences an endogenous
transition from stagnation to growth. Our ndings can be summarized as follows.
The model initially features a pre-industrial era, in which the economy is in stagnation
with very slow economic growth. In this pre-industrial era, income inequality is determined
by an unequal distribution of land ownership and remains stationary. When the market
size becomes su¢ciently large due to population growth, the economy begins to experience
innovation, and the output growth rate becomes gradually rising over time until it converges
to the steady state. In this industrial era, income inequality also gradually rises until the
economy reaches the balanced growth path.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. Our model features hetero-
geneous households in the form of an unequal distribution of assets. This wealth inequality
gives rise to income inequality.2 In the pre-industrial era, income inequality is caused by an
unequal distribution of land ownership, which is stationary over time and leads to a con-
stant degree of income inequality. In the industrial era, the economy experiences innovation
and a gradually rising growth rate, which in turn leads to a gradually rising interest rate
through the households Euler equation. As a result, the importance of asset income, which
is unequally distributed, increases over time and gives rise to increasing inequality until the
economy reaches the balanced growth path.
We also calibrate the model to current data in the UK to perform a quantitative analysis.
Simulating the transitional paths of the output growth rate and the real interest rate, we nd
that the increase in the simulated growth rate and the simulated interest rate is consistent
with historical data in the UK. Finally, we simulate the transitional path of income inequality
and nd that income inequality increases sharply when the takeo¤ occurs. When the economy
reaches the balanced growth path, income inequality is almost twice as high as the level
prior to the takeo¤, and the steady-state level of income inequality is in line with the Gini
coe¢cient of income in the UK in recent time.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The seminal
R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990) features the invention of new products (i.e.,
horizontal innovation) as the engine of growth. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the
Schumpeterian model, in which economic growth is driven by the development of higher-
quality products (i.e., vertical innovation).3 Subsequent studies, such as Smulders and van
de Klundert (1995), Peretto (1998, 1999) and Howitt (1999), combine vertical and horizontal
innovation that gives rise to the second-generation Schumpeterian model.4 This study con-
1Lindert (2000a, b) also nds a rise in income inequality in Britain in as early as the late 18th century.
2Piketty (2014) provides evidence for the importance of wealth inequality on income inequality.
3See also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990).
4Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008, 2010) and Ang and Madsen (2011)
provide supportive empirical evidence for the second-generation Schumpeterian model.
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tributes to the literature by introducing heterogeneous households into a second-generation
Schumpeterian model with endogenous takeo¤ to explore the e¤ects of innovation on income
inequality.5
This study also relates to the literature on inequality and economic growth. Early studies
in this literature explore how inequality a¤ects economic growth via capital accumulation;
see for example Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). An interesting
study by Galor and Moav (2004) shows that in the early (later) stage of development in
which the accumulation of physical (human) capital is the main engine of growth, inequality
stimulates (sties) economic growth. Subsequent studies consider how inequality a¤ects
the demand and supply of R&D in the innovation-driven growth model. On the demand
side, Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) nd that inequality has both
a positive price e¤ect and a negative market-size e¤ect on the demand for innovation due
to households non-homothetic preferences. On the supply side, Garcia-Penalosa and Wen
(2008) explore the insurance e¤ect of redistribution, which increases innovation by providing
more incentives for risk-averse agents to become R&D entrepreneurs.6 Recent studies by
Jones and Kim (2018) and Aghion et al. (2019) focus on the relationship between innovation
and top-income inequality. Other studies, such as Chu (2010), Chu and Cozzi (2018) and
Chu et al. (2019), analyze the e¤ects of patent policy and monetary policy on innovation and
income inequality. This study di¤ers from previous studies by considering a Schumpeterian
model with endogenous takeo¤ and analyzing the historical evolution of income inequality
from stagnation to growth.
Finally, this study relates to the literature on endogenous takeo¤ and economic growth.
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) provide the seminal studies and develop
unied growth theory.7 Unied growth theory explores how the quality-quantity tradeo¤ in
childrearing and human capital accumulation allow an economy to escape from the Malthu-
sian trap and experience economic growth.8 Although the Schumpeterian model in Peretto
(2015) features exogenous population growth and does not capture the Malthusian trap, the
innovation-driven takeo¤ in the model relates to the Industrial Revolution, which is arguably
the most important economic takeo¤ in human history.9 Furthermore, this growth-theoretic
framework allows us to explore how innovation a¤ects the rate of return on assets and the
evolution of income inequality upon incorporating heterogeneous households into the model.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the dynamics and derives the evolution of income inequality. Section 4 performs a
quantitative analysis. Section 5 concludes.
5Aghion et al. (2019) and Madsen et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence that innovation and inequality
have a positive relationship.
6Chou and Talmain (1996) also explore how redistribution a¤ects the supply of labor for R&D.
7See also Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) for other early studies on endogenous takeo¤.
8See Galor and Mountford (2008) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) for recent studies and empirical evidence
that supports unied growth theory. Galor (2011) provides an excellent review of unied growth theory.
9Mokry (2016) writes that "innovations in Europe triggered the Industrial Revolution and the sustained
economic progress that spread across the globe."
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2 A Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous
households and endogenous takeo¤
The Schumpeterian model with endogenous takeo¤ is based on Peretto (2015). We introduce
heterogeneous households into the Peretto model.10 Our analysis provides a complete closed-
form solution for economic growth and income inequality from stagnation to takeo¤ and
eventually to the balanced growth path.
2.1 Heterogeneous households
There is a unit continuum of households, which are indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. They have identical
homothetic preferences over consumption. However, households are heterogeneous in their
levels of wealth. Household hs utility function is given by
U(h) =
1Z
0
e t ln ct(h)dt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the rate of subjective discounting and ct(h) is household hs
consumption of nal good (numeraire). Household h maximizes (1) subject to
_at(h) = rtat(h) + wtLt   ct(h). (2)
at(h) is the real value of assets owned by household h, and rt is the real interest rate. These
assets include the ownership of land Rt(h) and monopolistic rms. Household h supplies
Lt units of labor to earn a real wage rate wt, where Lt increases at the rate  > 0. From
standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   , (3)
which shows that the growth rate of consumption is the same across households such that
_ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct = rt   , where ct 
R 1
0
ct(h)dh is aggregate consumption.
2.2 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good Yt using the following production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)[Z

t (i)Z
1 
t L

t (i)R
1 
t ]
1 di,
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Xt(i) denotes the quantity of non-durable intermediate good i 2
[0; Nt], and Nt is the mass of available intermediate goods at time t. The productivity of
10We use the approach in Chu (2010), Chu and Cozzi (2018) and Chu et al. (2019) to model heterogeneous
households in the Schumpeterian model.
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intermediate good Xt(i) depends on its own quality Zt(i) and also on the average quality
Zt 
1
Nt
R Nt
0
Zt(i)di of all intermediate goods capturing technology spillovers. The private
return to quality is determined by , and the degree of technology spillovers is determined
by 1  . Final-good rms also rent land Rt and recruit labor Lt(i) for i 2 [0; Nt].
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions fRdt ; L
d
t (i); X
d
t (i)g:
Rdt = (1  )(1  )Yt=!t, (4)
Ldt (i) =

(1  )
wt
Xt (i)[Z

t (i)Z
1 
t (i)R
1 
t ]
1 
1=[1 (1 )]
, (5)
Xdt (i) =


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t L

t (i)R
1 
t , (6)
where pt(i) is the price of Xt(i) and !t is the rental price of Rt = R, which is in xed supply.
Lt(i) in (6) is the equilibrium level of labor in industry i 2 [0; Nt]. Competitive producers of
nal good pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di for intermediate goods and (1  )Yt = wt
R Nt
0
Lt(i)di
for labor.
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Monopolistic rms produce di¤erentiated intermediate goods with a linear technology that
requires Xt(i) units of nal good to produce Xt(i) units of intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt];
therefore, the marginal cost of production for the monopolistic rm is one. The rm in
industry i also incurs Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of nal good as a xed operating cost. To improve
the quality of its product, the rm devotes It(i) units of nal good to R&D. The innovation
specication is given by
_Zt(i) = It(i). (7)
In industry i, the monopolistic rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t(i) = [pt(i)  1]Xt(i)  Z

t (i)Z
1 
t . (8)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt(i) =
Z
1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s(i)  Is(i)] ds. (9)
The monopolistic rm in industry i maximizes (9) subject to (6)-(8) taking the equilibrium
level of labor in the industry as given. The current-value Hamiltonian for this optimization
problem is
Ht(i) = t(i)  It(i) + t(i) _Zt(i), (10)
where t(i) is the co-state variable on (7). We solve this optimization problem in the Ap-
pendix and derive the unconstrained prot-maximizing markup ratio given by 1=.
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Competitive rms can also produce Xt(i) with the same quality Zt(i) as the monopolistic
rm.11 However, they have a higher unit cost of production given by  > 1. Therefore, the
equilibrium price chosen by the monopolistic rm becomes
pt(i) = min f; 1=g . (11)
We assume  < 1= implying that pt(i) = .
We follow previous studies to consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt(i) = Zt for
i 2 [0; Nt]. In this case, the market-clearing condition for labor implies Lt(i) = Lt=Nt, and the
size of intermediate-good rms is also identical across all industries, such that Xt(i) = Xt.
12
From (6) and pt(i) = , the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
=



1=(1 )
Lt
Nt

R1 . (12)
We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  
1=(1 )Xt
Zt
= 1=(1 )

Lt
Nt

R1 . (13)
xt is a state variable that is determined by the quality-adjusted rm size, which in turn
depends on Lt=Nt.
13 Lemma 1 derives the rate of return on quality-improving R&D, which
is increasing in the rm size xt.
Lemma 1 The rate of return to in-house R&D is given by
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

. (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.4 Entrants
Following previous studies, we assume that entrants have access to aggregate technology Zt
to ensure symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new rm pays Xt units of nal good to set
up its operation and enter the market with a new variety of di¤erentiated products.  > 0
is a cost parameter, and the cost function Xt captures the case in which the setup cost is
increasing in the initial output volume of the rm. The asset-pricing equation determines
the rate of return on assets as
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (15)
11Here we assume di¤usion of technologies from the monopolistic rm to competitive rms in each industry.
12Symmetry also implies t(i) = t, It(i) = It and Vt(i) = Vt.
13See Laincz and Peretto (2006) for empirical evidence on Nt being proportional to Lt.
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When entry is positive, the entry condition is given by
Vt = Xt. (16)
Substituting (7), (8), (13), (16) and pt(i) =  into (15) yields the return on entry as
ret =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 
+ zt
xt

+
_xt
xt
+ zt, (17)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
2.5 Value of land
Let vt denote the unit value of land. Then, the asset-pricing equation for vt is rtvt = !t+ _vt.
This asset-pricing equation states that the return on land is determined by the rental price
of land and the capital gain in land value.
2.6 General equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; ct; Yt; Lt; Rt; Xt(i); It(i)g and a time path
of prices frt; wt; !t; vt; pt(i); Vt (i)g such that the following conditions are satised:
 households maximize utility taking frt; wt; !tg as given;
 nal-good rms produce Yt and maximize prot taking fpt(i); wt; !tg as given;
 intermediate-good rms produce Xt(i) and choose fpt(i); It(i)g to maximize Vt(i) tak-
ing rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the value of land and monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households assets
such that vtR + VtNt =
R 1
0
at(h)dh  at;
 the market-clearing condition of land holds such that
R 1
0
Rt(h)dh = R;
 the market-clearing condition of labor holds such that
R Nt
0
Lt(i)di = NtLt(i) = Lt;
 the following market-clearing condition of nal good also holds:
Yt = ct +Nt(Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt. (18)
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2.7 Aggregation
Substituting (6) into the production function and imposing symmetry yield
Yt = (=)
=(1 )N1 t ZtL

tR
1 , (19)
which also uses markup pricing pt(i) = . Therefore, the growth rate of output is
_Yt
Yt
= (1  )nt + zt + , (20)
which is determined by the variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt and the quality growth rate zt.
3 Dynamics
This section analyzes the dynamics of the model. See Section 3.1 for the dynamics of the
aggregate economy. See Section 3.2 for the dynamics of the wealth distribution. See Section
3.3 for the dynamics of the income distribution.
3.1 Dynamics of the aggregate economy
We analyze the dynamics of the economy across three eras. In the pre-industrial era, neither
variety innovation nor quality innovation is activated. In the rst industrial era, variety
innovation is activated. In the second industrial era, quality innovation is also activated.
In the pre-industrial era, the rm size xt is so small (i.e., xt < 
1=(1 )=(   1)) that
monopolistic rms cannot earn a positive prot. Therefore, all intermediate goods N0 are
produced by competitive rms at pt(i) =  given that they do not incur the operating cost.
In this case, the intermediate-good sector generates zero prot, and the value of monopolistic
rms is zero. Therefore, consumption is given by the rental income from land and the wage
income from labor such that ct = !tR + wtLt, so the consumption-output ratio is simply
ct=Yt = 1   in the pre-industrial era.
In the rst industrial era, variety innovation is activated. In this case, the consumption-
output ratio ct=Yt jumps to the steady-state value in Lemma 2 and remains at this value
also in the second industrial era.
Lemma 2 Once variety innovation is activated, the consumption-output ratio jumps to
ct
Yt
=


+ 1  . (21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above analysis implies that consumption and output grow at the same rate given by
gt 
_Yt
Yt
=
_ct
ct
= rt   , (22)
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where the last equality uses (3). In the pre-industrial era, the growth rate of output is simply
gt = ; therefore, the real interest rate is given by rt =  + . In the rst industrial era,
the growth rate of output becomes gt =  + (1   )nt due to variety innovation; in this
case, the real interest rate is given by rt = + + (1  )nt. In the second industrial era,
we can substitute (14) into (22) to derive the growth rate of output as
gt = + (1  )nt + zt = 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

  , (23)
and the real interest rate is rt = + gt. Then, (23) implies that the quality growth rate is
zt = 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

      (1  )nt. (24)
The quality growth rate zt is positive if and only if xt > xZ , where xZ is a threshold for the
rm size xt above which quality innovation starts to occur.
14 Intuitively, innovation requires
the rm size xt to be large enough so that it is protable for rms to do in-house R&D.
From (13), the growth rate of the rm size xt is given by
_xt
xt
= (  nt). (25)
In the pre-industrial era, the growth rate of xt is _xt=xt =  because nt = 0. In the rst
industrial era, the growth rate of variety is given by
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 

xt

  , (26a)
which is obtained from substituting (20), (22) and (25) into (17). The variety growth rate
nt is positive if and only if xt > 
1=(1 )=(  1 )  xN , where xN is a threshold for the
rm size xt above which variety innovation starts to occur.
15 Substituting (26a) into (25)
yields an one-dimensional di¤erential equation in xt in the rst industrial era. In the second
industrial era, the growth rate of variety becomes
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 
+ zt
xt

  , (26b)
where zt is given in (24). Substituting (24) and (26b) into (25) also yields an one-dimensional
di¤erential equation in xt in the second industrial era. Therefore, the dynamics of xt in (25)
is autonomous in all three eras. Proposition 1 summarizes the dynamics of xt.
14We provide the denition of xZ in the proof of Proposition 1.
15We assume xN < xZ (i.e., variety innovation occurs before quality innovation). When 
1=(1 )=( 1) <
xt < xN , monopolistic rms in N0 are able to earn positive prots, but we assume that intermediate goods
are produced by competitive rms until xt reaches xN because it takes time for the sector to be monopolized.
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Proposition 1 In the pre-industrial era (i.e., xt < xN), the dynamics of xt is given by _xt =
xt. In the rst industrial era (i.e., xt 2 [xN ; xZ ]), the dynamics of xt is given by
_xt = 

1=(1 )

 

  1

    

xt

.
In the second industrial era (i.e., xt > xZ), the linearized dynamics of xt is given by
_xt = 

1=(1 )

[(1  )    ] 

(1  )
  1

    

xt

.
Therefore, given + < min f(1  ); (1  )(  1)=g, the dynamics of xt is stable, and
xt converges to a unique steady state. The steady-state values fx
; gg are
x = 1=(1 )
(1  )  (+ )
(1  )(  1)  (+ )
> xZ, (27)
g = 

  1
1=(1 )
x   

   > 0. (28)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The dynamics of xt in (25) and (26) shows that given an initial value x0, the state variable
xt grows over time. When the rm size xt becomes su¢ciently large, variety innovation
occurs, and then quality innovation also occurs. Eventually, xt converges to its steady-state
value x in (27), which also determines Nt = [
1=(1 )R1 =x]1=Lt that grows at the rate
 on the balanced growth path. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of xt.
16
Figure 1: Transition path of the rm size
16TN (TZ) denotes the time when variety (quality) innovation is activated.
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Figure 2: Transition path of the growth rate
Figure 2 presents the dynamics of economic growth. In the pre-industrial era, the growth
rate of output is simply gt =  due to the absence of innovation. In the rst industrial
era, the rm size xt determines the variety growth rate according to (26a) and the output
growth rate according to gt =  + (1   )nt. In the second industrial era, the rm size xt
determines the quality growth rate and the output growth rate gt according to (23). When
xt converges to x
 in (27), gt also converges to its steady-state value g
 in (28). This gradual
acceleration in economic growth in Figure 2 is consistent with historical data in the UK.
Figure 3 plots the log level of real GDP,17 in which the slope shows the growth rate. The
average growth rates in the UK were 0.71% in the rst half of the 18th century, 1.24% in
the second half of the 18th century, 1.86% in the rst half of the 19th century, 2.23% in the
second half of the 19th century, 1.50% in the rst half of the 20th century and 2.55% from
the second half of the 20th century onwards. Except for the wartime periods in the rst half
of the 20th century, the UK economy experiences a gradually rising growth rate as in our
Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeo¤.
17Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Figure 3: Log of real GDP in the UK from 1700 to 2016
3.2 Dynamics of the wealth distribution
In the pre-industrial era, the value of monopolistic rms is zero; therefore, the wealth distri-
bution is determined solely by the distribution of land. The initial share of land owned by
household h is sR(h)  R0(h)=R, which is exogenously given at time 0. We nd that during
the pre-industrial era, the distribution of land is stationary. When the economy reaches the
rst industrial era at time  > 0, the value of monopolistic rms becomes positive. Then,
for any given xt at any time t   , we nd that the distribution of assets, which consist of
land and intangible capital, continues to be stationary and determined by the initial distrib-
ution of land at time 0. It is useful to recall that the aggregate economy features transition
dynamics determined by the evolution of xt. However, the wealth distribution is stationary
despite the transition dynamics in the aggregate economy because the consumption-output
ratio is stationary as shown in Lemma 2, which in turn implies that the consumption-wealth
ratio is also stationary.
Aggregating (2) across all households yields the following asset-accumulation equation:
_at = rtat + wtLt   ct. (29)
We substitute (3) and (1 )Yt = wtLt into (29) to derive the following di¤erential equation
for ct=at:
_ct
ct
 
_at
at
=

1  (1  )
Yt
ct

ct
at
  , (30)
where ct=Yt is simply 1   in the pre-industrial era and given by (21) in the industrial era.
Therefore, the coe¢cient on ct=at is always positive implying that the consumption-wealth
12
ratio must jump to
ct
at
=

1  (1  )Yt=ct
, (31)
whenever the consumption-output ratio ct=Yt changes.
Let sa;t(h)  at(h)=at denote the share of assets owned by household h. Then, the growth
rate of sa;t(h) is given by
_sa;t(h)
sa;t(h)
=
_at(h)
at(h)
 
_at
at
=
ct   wtLt
at
 
sc;t(h)ct   wtLt
at(h)
, (32)
where sc;t(h)  ct(h)=ct is the share of consumption by household h at time t. Substituting
(1  )Yt = wtLt and (31) into (32) yields
_sa;t(h) = sa;t(h) 
ct
at
[sc;t(h)  1]  . (33)
To achieve stability of sa;t(h), _sa;t(h) = 0 must hold for any t  0 because sa;t(h) is a
pre-determined variable and its coe¢cient is positive. Therefore, we have sa;t(h) = sa;0(h),
which is achieved by sc;t(h) jumping to the steady-state values at t = 0 and t =  . Imposing
_sa;t(h) = 0 on (33) yields
sc;t(h) =

ct=at
[sa;0(h)  1] + 1, (34)
where ct=at is given in (31), in which ct=Yt is simply 1  in the pre-industrial era (i.e., t < )
and given by (21) in the two industrial eras (i.e., t  ). Therefore, we have sc;t(h) = sc;0(h)
for t <  and sc;t(h) = sc; (h) for t   . At time 0, the share of assets owned by household
h is determined by its share of land such that sa;0(h) = a0(h)=a0 = R0(h)=R  sR(h). We
summarize the dynamics of sa;t(h) in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The dynamics of sa;t(h) is given by an one-dimensional di¤erential equation:
_sa;t(h) = [sa;t(h)  sR(h)]. (35)
Also, the wealth distribution is stationary and determined by the initial distribution of land.
Proof. Proven in text.
Finally, we derive the Gini coe¢cient of wealth and show that it is also stationary. at(h)
is the share of wealth owned by household h, where the identity index h 2 [0; 1] is ordered in
an ascending order of wealth. Let a;t denote the Gini coe¢cient of wealth at time t, which
is dened as
a;t  1  2
Z 1
0
La;t(h)dh,
where the Lorenz curve of wealth is given by
La;t(h) 
R h
0
at()dR 1
0
at()d
=
R h
0
at()d
at
=
Z h
0
sa;t()d =
Z h
0
sa;0()d =
Z h
0
sR()d.
Therefore, the Gini coe¢cient of wealth is stationary, such that a;t = a;0 = R for all t,
where R is the Gini coe¢cient of land ownership at time 0.
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3.3 Dynamics of the income distribution
The income distribution is endogenous and nonstationary but analytically tractable. Al-
though the wealth distribution is stationary, the transition dynamics in the aggregate econ-
omy gives rise to an endogenous evolution of the income distribution. However, once we
derive the transitional path of the real interest rate, we can also derive the transitional path
of income inequality.
Income received by household h is given by
yt(h) = rtat(h) + wtLt. (36)
Aggregating (36) yields the aggregate level of income as
yt = rtat + wtLt. (37)
Let sy;t(h)  yt(h)=yt denote the share of income received by household h. Then, we have
sy;t(h) =
rtat(h) + wtLt
rtat + wtLt
=
rtat
rtat + wtLt
sR(h) +
wtLt
rtat + wtLt
, (38)
where we have used sa;t(h) = sR(h). Therefore, the evolution of the share of income received
by household h is determined by the evolution of the asset-wage income ratio rtat=(wtLt).
An increase in the asset-wage income ratio rtat=(wtLt) would increase (decrease) the income
share of household h if its wealth share sR(h) is larger (smaller) than one, which is the
average wealth share.18 In other words, an increase in the asset-wage income ratio enlarges
the dispersion of income because wealth inequality drives income inequality in our model.
Lemma 3 derives the Gini coe¢cient of income as our measure of income inequality y;t,
which is increasing in the asset-wage income ratio rtat=(wtLt).
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Lemma 3 The Gini coe¢cient of income is given by20
y;t =
rtat
rtat + wtLt
R. (39)
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the pre-industrial era, the value of intangible assets is zero, and hence we have
rtat = (+ gt)at =

1 +



at =

1 +



!tR. (40)
18Recall that there is a unit continuum of households.
19Madsen (2017) provides evidence that asset returns are an important determinant of income inequality.
20The coe¢cient of variation of income is also given by y;t =
rtat
rtat+wtLt
R if we instead dene y;t qR 1
0
[sy;t(h)  1]2dh and R 
qR 1
0
[sR(h)  1]2dh as the coe¢cients of variation of income and wealth.
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Therefore, income inequality in the pre-industrial era (i.e., t < ) is simply
y;t =

1 +

+ 
wtLt
!tR

 1
R =

1 +

+ 

1  

 1
R. (41)
Proposition 3 derives y;t in the industrial eras. We dene a parameter   =(1  ).
Proposition 3 After variety innovation occurs, the degree of income inequality for t   is
y;t =

1 +

+ gt

1   + =

 1
R. (42)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We summarize the evolution of income inequality as follows. In the pre-industrial era,
income inequality is given in (41). In the rst industrial era, the value of intangible assets
becomes positive, and income inequality jumps to
y;t =

1 +

+ + (1  )nt

1   + =

 1
R, (43)
where the term = captures the e¤ect of the emergence of intangible assets. Then, income
inequality increases over time due to the rising variety growth rate nt in (26a). In the second
industrial era, income inequality further increases to
y;t =

1 +

+ + (1  )nt + zt

1   + =

 1
R, (44)
where gt = +(1 )nt+ zt in (23) increases over time until reaching the balanced growth
path. On the balanced growth path, income inequality y is determined by the steady-state
growth rate g in (28). Figure 4 summarizes the dynamics of y;t from stagnation to takeo¤
and eventually to the steady state.
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Figure 4: Transition path of income inequality
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to UK data in order to perform a quantitative analysis.
The model features the following parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; ; g. We set the discount rate
 to 0.04. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the degree of technology spillovers 1  to
0.833. In the UK, the long-run population growth rate  is 0.6%.21 Then, we calibrate the
remaining parameters f; ; ; ; g by matching the following moments for the UK economy:
52.6% for labor income as a share of output,22 74.4% for consumption as a share of output,23
12.3% for housing rents as a share of output,24 2.5% for the growth rate of output,25 and
18.4% for investment as a share of output.26 Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values.27 These parameter values imply a rate of asset returns of 6.5% and R&D as a share
of output of 2.0%, which are in line with UK data.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
       
0.040 0.167 0.006 0.351 14.468 0.810 2.138 0.245
21Data source: Maddison Project Database.
22Data source: O¢ce for National Statistics.
23Data source: O¢ce for National Statistics.
24Data source: New Economics Foundation.
25Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
26Data source: O¢ce for National Statistics. To compute this moment from the model, we add up expenses
on intermediate goods and horizontal/vertical R&D. One can think of the intermediate goods in our model
as investment in capital that depreciates rapidly.
27The calibrated value of  seems high but implies a reasonable prot share of output of 11.5%.
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Figure 5 presents the simulated paths of the output growth rate and the real interest
rate along with the HP-lter trends of the GDP growth rate and the rate of return on non-
residential xed capital in the UK.28 We choose an initial value x0 such that the takeo¤
occurs in the late 18th century.29 This gure shows that the output growth rate increases
from about 0.5% in the late 18th century to 2.5% in recent time. This gradual increase in
the growth rate and the magnitude of the increase are in line with historical data in the UK.
Figure 5 also shows that the real interest rate increases from 4.5% in the late 18th century to
an average of 5.9% in the 19th century and reaches an average of 6.4% in the 20th century.
The average rates of return on non-residential xed capital in the UK were 5.1% in the 18th
century, 6.0% in the 19th century, and 7.0% from the 20th century onwards.30 Therefore,
the increase in the rate of return on assets and the magnitude of the increase in asset returns
predicted by our model are also in line with historical data.
Figure 5: Simulated paths of the growth rate and the interest rate
The increase in the real interest rate in Figure 5 implies an increase in income inequality
in our model. Figure 6 presents the simulated path of income inequality in terms of percent
changes from its initial value prior to the takeo¤. This gure shows that income inequality
increases sharply by about 50% when the takeo¤ occurs. When the economy reaches the
balanced growth path, income inequality would have almost doubled. Our model takes the
degree of wealth inequality as given. If we consider a Gini coe¢cient of wealth of 0.732 in
recent time,31 then we can also simulate the Gini coe¢cient of income. Figure 7 reports the
simulated path of income inequality along with the Gini coe¢cient of income in the UK from
1961 to 2017.32 It shows that the simulated Gini coe¢cient of income increases from 0.15
before the takeo¤ to 0.29 in the steady state.
28Here we use a smoothing parameter of 1000 on the annual data in order to extract a smoother trend.
29According to Ashton (1998), the Industrial Revolution started in as early as 1760.
30See Madsen (2017). The authors are grateful to Jakob Madsen for sharing this data series.
31Data source: Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook.
32Data source: Institute for Fiscal Studies. Data available from 1961.
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Figure 6: Simulated path of income inequality (percent change)
Figure 7: Simulated path of income inequality (Gini coe¢cient)
Williamson (1980, 1985) and Lindert (2000a, 2000b) examine historical data in Britain
and document that income inequality, based on di¤erent measures, increases in the late
18th century/early 19th century and levels o¤ after the mid-19th century. Then, income
inequality, measured by the top 1% income share, decreases from the early 20th century to
the late 1970s.33 As for the Gini coe¢cient of income, it decreases from 0.27 in the early
1960s to 0.24 in the late 1970s before rising again to as high as 0.36 in recent time with an
average value of 0.30 from 1961 to 2017 in the UK. Therefore, the long-run level of income
33World Inequality Database documents a decrease in the top 1% income share from 20% in the early 20th
century to 5% in the late 1970s.
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inequality predicted by our model is in line with recent data in the UK. Furthermore, our
model is able to deliver the pattern of rising income inequality in the late 18th century/early
19th century and its leveling o¤ in the late 19th century. However, our model is unable to
explain the decrease in income inequality from the early 20th century to the late 1970s. The
reason is that this decrease in income equality is driven by a decrease in wealth inequality,34
whereas our model takes wealth inequality as given.
To address this issue, we consider historical data on the income and wealth shares owned
by the top households, which have longer time series than the Gini coe¢cient. In our model,
the share of income owned by the top " households is given byZ 1
1 "
sy;t(h)dh =
rtat
rtat + wtLt
Z 1
1 "
sR(h)dh+
wtLt
rtat + wtLt
", (45)
where
R 1
1 "
sR(h)dh is the share of wealth owned by the top " households. We use histor-
ical data on the top 10% wealth share in the UK along with the asset-wage income ratio
rtat=(wtLt) computed from our model to simulate the top 10% income share. Figure 8
presents the simulated path of the top 10% income share along with data in the UK from
1900 to 2010.35 Given the data on wealth inequality, our model now predicts that income
inequality rises in the 19th century and falls from the early 20th century to the 1970s. After
that, income inequality becomes rising again. This pattern matches the data. Furthermore,
the average value of the top 10% income share in the UK from 1900 to 2010 is 0.37, whereas
our model predicts an average value of 0.36 in this period.
Figure 8: Simulated path of the top 10% income share
34World Inequality Database documents a decrease in the top 1% wealth share from 70% in the early 20th
century to less than 20% in the early 1980s.
35Data source: Piketty (2014). Data on the top 10% wealth (income) share is available from 1810 (1900).
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5 Conclusion
This study explores the historical origins of income inequality from stagnation to growth in
a Schumpeterian model with endogenous takeo¤ and heterogeneous households. Our results
can be summarized as follows. In the pre-industrial era, the economy is in stagnation, and
income inequality is determined by an unequal distribution of land ownership and remains
stationary. In the industrial era, income inequality rises sharply, and the gradually rising
growth rate in the economy causes income inequality to increase further over time until
the economy reaches the balanced growth path. We also calibrate the model to perform a
quantitative analysis and nd that the simulation results are roughly in line with historical
data in the UK.
To keep the dynamics analytically tractable, we do not consider the accumulation of
physical capital in our model. In the presence of physical capital, a no-arbitrage condition
would imply that the rental price of capital is determined by the real interest rate, which in
turn is the driving force for the evolution of income inequality in our model. Furthermore,
we assume that households have homothetic preferences under which the income distribution
does not a¤ect the aggregate economy; in other words, changes in inequality have no direct
e¤ect on economic growth in our model. Given that previous studies have already explored in
details how inequality could a¤ect economic growth (see the discussion in the introduction),
this study focuses on how the innovation-driven takeo¤ during the Industrial Revolution
inuences the evolution of income inequality. We leave to future research the interesting
question of how inequality a¤ects the takeo¤ of an economy.36
36An interesting study by Voigtlander and Voth (2006) shows that "redistributive institutions [in Britain]
were not decisive in fostering industrialization."
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic rm i is given by
(10). To introduce the upper bound  on price pt (i), we modify (10) as follows:
37
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) + t (i) [  pt (i)] , (10)
where t (i) is the multiplier on pt (i)  . Substituting (6)-(8) into (10), we can derive
@Ht (i)
@pt (i)
= 0)
@t (i)
@pt (i)
= t (i) , (A1)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A2)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[pt (i)  1]


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Lt (i)R
1    
)
Z1 t
Z1 t (i)
= rtt (i)  _t (i) . (A3)
If pt (i) < , then t (i) = 0; in this case, @t (i) =@pt (i) = 0 yields pt (i) = 1=. If the
constraint on pt (i) is binding, then t (i) > 0; in this case, pt (i) = . Given  < 1=, we
have pt (i) = . We use (A2), (13) and pt (i) =  in (A3) and impose symmetry for (14).
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting (16) into at = NtVt + vtR yields
at = NtXt + vtR = (=)Yt + vtR, (A4)
where the second equality uses Yt = Nt(Xt).
38 Di¤erentiating (A4) with respect to t yields
(=) _Yt + _vtR = _at = rt[(=)Yt + vtR] + wtLt   ct, (A5)
where the second equality uses (29) and (A4). Using (3) for rt, (4) for !t, rtvt = !t+ _vt and
(1  )Yt = wtLt, we can rearrange (A5) to obtain
_ct
ct
 
_Yt
Yt
=


ct
Yt
 

+
 (1  )


, (A6)
where the right-hand side is increasing in ct=Yt with a strictly negative y-intercept. Therefore,
ct=Yt must jump to the steady-state value in (21).
Proof of Proposition 1. In the pre-industrial era, the variety growth rate nt is zero; in
this case, the dynamics of xt in (25) is given by _xt = xt. Equation (26a) shows that when
xt > xN , variety innovation occurs (i.e., nt > 0); in this case, we substitute (26a) into (25)
to derive the dynamics of xt in the rst industrial era. In the second industrial era (i.e.,
xt > xZ), quality innovation also occurs (i.e., zt > 0); in this case, we can substitute (26b)
into (24) and set zt = 0 to derive the following threshold:
xZ  arg
x
solve

  1
1=(1 )
x  
 
 
1=(1 )(1  )
x

= (+ )

.
37Note that Lt(i) is not chosen by the monopolistic rm i, which takes its equilibrium level in (6) as given.
38We derive this by using pt(i) =  and Xt(i) = Xt for Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di.
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We can also substitute (24) into (26b) to derive
nt =
[(1  )(  1)  ]xt=
1=(1 )   (1  )+ + 
xt=1=(1 )   (1  )
. (A7)
Substituting (A7) into (25) yields
_xt =

   (1  )1=(1 )=xt
(d1   d2xt) , (A8)
where we dene
d1  
1=(1 ) [(1  )    ] , (A9a)
d2  

(1  )(  1)

    

. (A9b)
We approximate (1  )1=(1 )=xt  0 in (A8). The resulting linearized dynamics of xt has
a unique steady state that is stable if d1 > 0 and d2 > 0 from which we obtain  +  <
min f(1  ); (1  )(  1)=g. Then, _xt = 0 yields x
 = d1=d2 in (27), and we impose
parameter restrictions to ensure x > xZ . Finally, substituting (27) into (23) yields (28).
Proof of Lemma 3. Income received by household h is given by
yt(h) = rtat(h) + wtLt = rtatsa;t(h) + wtLt = rtatsR(h) + wtLt, (A10)
where the identity index h 2 [0; 1] is uniformly distributed and ordered in an ascending order
of income. The Gini coe¢cient of income is dened as
y;t = 1  2
Z 1
0
Ly;t(h)dh, (A11)
where Ly;t(h) is the Lorenz curve of income. Ly;t(h) is given by
Ly;t(h) 
R h
0
yt()dR 1
0
yt()d
=
rtat
R h
0
sR()d+ wtLt
R h
0
1d
rtat + wtLt
, (A12)
where
R h
0
1d = h and
R h
0
sR()d is the Lorenz curve La(h) of wealth. Substituting (A12)
into (A11) yields
y;t = 1 
2rtat
rtat + wtLt
Z 1
0
La(h)dh+
wtLt
rtat
Z 1
0
hdh

, (A13)
where
R 1
0
hdh = 0:5. Substituting the Gini coe¢cient of wealth a  1   2
R 1
0
La(h)dh into
(A13) yields the Gini coe¢cient of income in (39).
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (3) and (1  )Yt = wtLt, we obtain
rtat
wtLt
=
+ gt
(1  )
at
Yt
=
+ gt
(1  )
at
ct
ct
Yt
. (A14)
Substituting (21) and (31) into (A14) yields
rtat
wtLt
=
+ gt





1  
+ 1  

. (A15)
Finally, we substitute (A15) into (39) to derive (42).
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